This is a piece by a University friend of mine who graduated with a first class honours in Media and Culture Studies, Euan Dargie. This post is on the same book and topic as my “What is Power?” post. As you’ll see, our responses and interpretations of the same book are vastly different. This is the great thing about sociology, everyone’s own ideas and interpretations are valid, as long as we have the evidence to back it up and make a strong argument. Each student is expected to have different essays when they submit for marking because sociology can be a very subjective course to study, especially when you get into your later years at university when you find your niches to drawn connections with the theory. This is the level of writing comprehension and style of writing you will reach as you graduate. Enjoy the selection of sociological themed memes selected by Euan!
In Power: A Radical View Steven Lukes states that: “In brief, my suggestion is that the one dimensional view of power presupposes a liberal conception of interests, the two-dimensional view a reformist conception, and the three-dimensional view a radical conception” [2005:38], while Lukes’ radical framework for examining power is now four decades old, it will be argued that it stands up to critical scrutiny, partially due to Lukes’ willingness to accept criticism leading to his conceptual framework having a flexible nature, insofar as it is has been reforged. However, it is just one tool in the examination of power and it gains in usefulness when used alongside other theoretical concepts. In order to show its enduring strength, it will be employed to examine the role that positive psychology has in the formation of public policy.
There are three keys issues that Lukes raises with the one dimensional and two dimensional views of power: Methodological, theoretical and political [2005:14-15]. In terms of methodological issues Lukes highlights the limits of a behaviourist approach, the role of values in the explanation of power and methodological individualism [2005:14]. With regard to the theoretical criticisms, Lukes highlights the limits or bias of pluralism, false consciousness and real interests [2005:14-15]. Finally, with political criticisms Lukes focuses on the three key areas covered in the Dahl [1961 cited in Lukes 2005]: urban redevelopment, public education and political nominations [2005:15] In addition to this Lukes examines poverty and race relations in Baltimore, and air pollution. Lukes does stress that “these matters will not be discussed in their own right, but merely alluded to at relevant points in the argument” [2005:15], the issues themselves therefore at not the important factor but how they are discussed in studies. At this point it is worth noting that the methodological and theoretical criticisms made by Lukes are key to understanding the importance of Lukes’ argument in a contemporary setting, an example being with the influence of behaviourist thinkers in the “happiness movement” have over public policy in the United Kingdom. This influence will be discussed later.
Lukes terms the pluralist view of power as the “one-dimensional view” [2005:16]. This is a simple approach to the study of power insofar as it follows a simple formula of “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” [Dahl 1957 cited in Lukes 2005:16]. In regard to the study of power this focuses almost solely on “concrete, observable behaviour” [Lukes 2005:17 emphasis in original], this comes from the pluralists view that it is the role of the researcher to only study behaviour that is observable [Polsby 1963 & Merelman 1968 both cited in Lukes 2005], and accurately shows Lukes’ criticism “that the pluralists’ conclusions are already built into their concepts, approach and methods” [2005:16]. Insofar as, while in certain circumstances they can reach pluralist conclusions, and in other circumstances they can reach different circumstance [Lukes 2005:16], the focus solely on decision making processes allows them only to see decision making processes. To the pluralists power in decision-making is best shown through conflict. In terms of A and B the effect of A’s power/influence/control over B would be shown in the A triumphing over B in terms of a clash of interests. In this model there is an assumption that the interests are consciously formed, “exhibited on actions, and thus to be discovered by observing people’s behaviour” [Lukes 2005:19]. In addition, Lukes argues that the “pluralists assume that interests are to be understood as policy preferences” [2005:19 emphasis in original]. It can then be drawn from that, that a conflict of interests is simply a conflict of preferences. There are clear limitations to this position, as interests cannot be simply reduced to preferring one policy over another, but work at a variety of levels both conscious and unconscious, are articulated and unarticulated, are known and unknown [Lukes 2005:19]. There is an uncritical nature to the one-dimensional model, by reducing power to influence over what policies are enacted, it can be used to argue that any bourgeois democracy is democratic, as on the surface a number of interests can be served [Lukes 2005:15].
In terms of a two-dimensional view of power, Lukes highlights a difficulty in that reformist critics of Dahl’s study use power in two distinct senses [2005:21]. They still use the behaviourist definition of A getting B to something B would not otherwise do [Lukes 2005:21]. The other sense, they use power to describe “the securing of compliance through the threat of sanctions” [Lukes 2005:21], which Lukes argues is better described as coercion [2005:21]. Despite differing from the behaviourist approach by focusing on nondecision-making as well as decision-making [Lukes 2005:22], they still focus on conflict, assuming that it is a feature of both decision-making and non decision-making [Lukes 2005:23]. According to Lukes the two-dimensional view of power does provide “a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the first view” [Lukes 2005:24 emphasis in original], yet still focuses on (non)decision-making processes through policy preferences and “subpolitical grievances” [Lukes 2005:25].
The three-dimensional model criticises the first two models focus on behaviour as being too individualistic and seeks to critique this behavioural focus [Lukes 2005:28] by focusing on four aspects: “decision-making and control over political agenda (not necessarily through decisions)”, “issues and potential issues”, “observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict” and “subjective and real interests” [Lukes 2005:29], this is also seen when Lukes asserts that while there are difficulties with the three-dimensional view, “they certainly do not require us to consign the three-dimensional view of power to the realm of the merely metaphysical or the merely ideological” [2005:59]. However, it can be argued that Lukes also looks at wider structural conditions for the examination of power, particularly when he returns to it, and addresses criticisms for the 2005 edition.
Through engaging with criticisms and other works in both editions of Power: A Radical View, Lukes shows the strength of his framework. It can be argued that Peter Morriss is the most vocal critic of Lukes. In addressing Morriss’ first criticisms, in relating power to responsibility, in that if someone holds power they must be held to account [cited in Lukes 2005:66]. Morriss goes on to argue that if someone is powerless due to the society they live in then this can be addressed by changing the social order [cited in Lukes 2005:67-68] and that: “A radical critique of a society requires us to evaluate that society, not distribute praise or blame to people” [Morriss 2002:40-42 cited in Lukes 2005:68 emphasis in Lukes]. While Lukes accepts structural arguments around powerlessness and domination, he does note that there are instances where “people often rendered and kept powerless by the deliberate activities of others” [2005:68], his main counter to Morriss’ criticisms is that the concept of power used by Morriss is too narrow [2005:68]. As stated earlier by Lukes “power is real and effective in a remarkable variety of ways, some of them indirect and some hidden” [2005:64], and that this “is at its most effective when least accessible to observation, to actors and observers alike” [2005:64], with these actors being of “many kinds: states, institutions, associations, alliances, social movements, groups, clubs and so on” [Lukes 2005:72]. Therefore “social life can only properly be understood as an interplay of power and structure” [Lukes 2005:68-
69]. It can be argued that this can also be understood in terms of Lukács’ concept of totality [1968], the “web of possibilities” [Lukes 2005:69] that means that action and structure are an interwoven whole.
As the purpose of sociology is not solely to be a thought exercise but it must apply the real world. Therefore the key to the endurance of a theoretical framework is whether it still can be used to explain current phenomena, and in following Lukes’ theoretical framework to examine hidden power the role of positive psychology in forming social policy will be examined. The criticisms of the behaviourist approach highlighted in Lukes criticisms of the one-dimensional view of power, also apply to political psychology, particularly in the application of the behaviourist Positive Psychology in
the policies of both the Labour and the Coalition governments [Fitzpatrick 2011]. In many ways, this represents a logical conclusion of a behaviourist approach to understanding power, if the decision making of populous can be influenced into making the “right” choices. The influence of behaviourist approaches can be seen in Martin Seligman being appointed Blair’s “happiness Tsar”, Richard Thaler being appointed to the Behavioural Insight Team set up by Cameron [Fitzpatrick 2011], and can be seen in some elements of the Scottish Government’s Curriculum for Excellence in terms of the focus on recognising achievement and building “a sense of physical, emotional and mental wellbeing” [Education Scotland ND] being heavily influenced by the Three Pillars of Positive Psychology: positive emotions, positive traits and positive institutions [Seligman 2002:xiii]. The political application of Seligman’s ideas that if we focus on the positives we become happier [2002] results in a (a)political theory which seeks to “conveys the multifaceted nature of wellbeing and will help policy-makers and citizens understand which domains of wellbeing should constitute priorities for public policy” [Forgeard et al 2011]. Not only do the Positive Psychologists make the same assumptions as earlier behaviourists that the bourgeois state is benign, but take that further to use their behaviourist theories as tool to enforce power. They also site the unhappiness an individual experiences as coming from the individual, and in no way related to the conditions of the spaces the individual inhabits. It is the siting the problem with the individual that is key to understanding the role of positive psychology in terms of power.
It can be argued that positive psychology is a form of domination. While this is explicit in nudge theory [Thaler & Sunstein 2008], which in many ways is a practical application of the one dimensional view of power – A getting B to do something B would not otherwise do. With positive psychology more generally, the mechanics of this domination is subtler. The focus on the individual that is central to positive psychology is rooted in the liberal subject. The role this has it situated along multiple axes, and becomes a feedback loop. Seligman, Thaler et al are influenced by the bourgeois individual, as they have succeeded within the capitalist system they see the system as a success, and are unable to see the system from any other stand point other than their own [see Lukács 1968]. Their theories are picked up by successive governments due to the confirmation of the system, so it then feeds back into reproducing the Individual. It is this that turns positive psychology into a form of domination by creating “favourable alignment of social relations” [Lukes
2005:78], and fostering a false consciousness, with two main outcomes. The first, as discussed, is a reinforcing of the primacy of the individual. The second is that flak directed towards the conditions created by capitalism is effectively deflected back to those dominated; it is not poor housing, low wages or unemployment that is making you unhappy, but your own failure to be happy with your conditions. Just as Lukes employs Spinoza’s argument that: “One man’s power of judgement can be subject to the right of a second in another way: the first man may be the dupe of the second” [1677 cited in Lukes 2005:87]. Lukes builds upon this when he states:
Power can be deployed to block or impair its subjects’ capacity to reason well, not least by instilling and sustaining misleading or illusory ideas of what is ‘natural’ and what sort of life their distinctive ‘nature’ dictates, and, in general, by stunting or capacity for rational judgement [2005:115]
The application Positive psychology blunts the capacity to reason, simply by dismissing criticisms of a system of subjection and reinforcing its ideology – effectively imposing a false consciousness. Lukes framework for understanding power goes beyond Foucault’s arguments about the power of psychiatry [1961/1995], which ultimately positive psychology is a part of. Although, arguments could be made that the power of positive psychology can be seen in terms of Regulation of Movement [1961/1995:172], insofar as the subject becomes unable to move through a social space.
However, there are stronger arguments around panopticonism [Foucault 1975/1991], particularly around the power’s gaze [1975/1991:202], with this gaze coming from within. However, it still remains that Lukes provides a better framework for understanding the power of the concept of the individual, by providing a mechanism for examining the material function of this power. With regard to the totality of society, this goes beyond Morriss’ argument that powerlessness and domination are conceptually different [2006:130], taking Lukes position Morriss somewhat makes the mistake again of being too narrow in the definition of power, they are but different manifestations of power.
Given that behaviourist explanations of power and society are to a certain extent still dominant, then Lukes criticisms and his model of conceptualising power is still relevant, but they can also gain further strength from other theoretical positions. The power of Positive Psychology can be part explained by Foucault’s theories of power, particularly with regard to the power of psychiatry and domination within society [1975/1991], which in many ways Positive Psychology represents, which effectively breaks out of the asylum to infect public policy. Also of use in building upon Lukes’ framework is Lukács’ concept of totality [1968], insofar as it can be used to argue the interconnectedness of all aspects of society. In addition, Lukes’ willingness to adapt in the face of criticism shows the enduring usefulness of his framework. Bringing all these points together suggests that his framework has withstood critical scrutiny.
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